Via BBC -
Somalia's al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab group has opened a new Twitter account in English, less than two weeks after its previous account was suspended.
A senior al-Shabab official told the BBC that the new account was genuine.
Al-Shabab's previous English-language account was suspended after it used it to announce it would kill a French hostage and then said it had done so.
Twitter's rules say that threats of violence are banned but it refused to comment on the suspension.
[...]
The new al-Shabab account has 280 followers, compared to the previous account which had more than 20,000 followers.
It was closed on 25 January, about a week after it announced the killing of a French spy, Denis Allex, it was holding hostage.
Mr Allex, who was kidnapped in Somalia in July 2009, was killed in retaliation for a failed French operation to free him.
Analysts say the US has wanted al-Shabab banned from Twitter for some time, but lacked the legal means to enforce its will.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research Brief - Violent Jihadism in Real Time: Al-Shabaab’s Use of Twitter
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/research_briefs/STARTResearchBrief_AlShabaabsTwitterUse.pdf
OVERVIEW
Since December 2011, the Somali jihadist group, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, had been actively using the popular micro-blogging platform Twitter to engage with English-speaking supporters. At the time of this brief’s publication, the organization (@HSMPress) had more than 20,000 followers and had tweeted approximately 1,250 times, before its English-language account was suspended by Twitter Jan. 25, 2013.
PROJECT BACKGROUND
This project is part of a broader paper published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy,” and seeks to analyze the al-Shabaab’s use of Twitter to better understand its messaging priorities. The findings show that the organization is most concerned with promoting its narrative, which states that Somalia is a front under siege in the war on Islam. The group also highlights its ability to carry out attacks and reject the bias of the Western media.
Showing posts with label Terrorism / CT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Terrorism / CT. Show all posts
Monday, February 4, 2013
Tuesday, June 26, 2012
Boko Haram Linking Up with al Shabaab and Al Qaeda
Via ChannelsTV.com -
Three of Africa’s largest extremist groups are sharing funds and swapping explosives in what could signal a dangerous escalation of security threats on the continent, the commander of the U.S. military’s Africa Command said on Monday.
General Carter Ham said there are indications that Boko Haram, al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – groups that he labeled as the continent’s most violent – are sharing money and explosive materials while training fighters together.
“Each of those three organizations is by itself a dangerous and worrisome threat,” Ham said at an African Center for Strategic Studies seminar for senior military and civilian officials from Africa, the United States and Europe.
“What really concerns me is the indications that the three organizations are seeking to coordinate and synchronize their efforts,” Ham said. “That is a real problem for us and for African security in general.”
The United States classified three of the alleged leaders of the Islamist sect Boko Haram, based in remote northeast Nigeria, as “foreign terrorist,” on June 20. But it declined to blacklist the entire organization to avoid elevating the group’s profile internationally. Police in Nigeria said members of the group seized a prison there Sunday and freed 40 inmates.
Islamist militant group al Shabaab is active in war-ravaged Somalia and has been blamed for attacks in Kenya. Last year it claimed responsibility for the death of Somali Interior Minister Abdi Shakur Sheikh Hassan.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an affiliate of al Qaeda based in North Africa, is mainly a criminal organization operating in the Sahel region. It kidnaps Westerners for ransom and aids Africa’s drug trade, according to intelligence officials.
Three of Africa’s largest extremist groups are sharing funds and swapping explosives in what could signal a dangerous escalation of security threats on the continent, the commander of the U.S. military’s Africa Command said on Monday.
General Carter Ham said there are indications that Boko Haram, al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – groups that he labeled as the continent’s most violent – are sharing money and explosive materials while training fighters together.
“Each of those three organizations is by itself a dangerous and worrisome threat,” Ham said at an African Center for Strategic Studies seminar for senior military and civilian officials from Africa, the United States and Europe.
“What really concerns me is the indications that the three organizations are seeking to coordinate and synchronize their efforts,” Ham said. “That is a real problem for us and for African security in general.”
The United States classified three of the alleged leaders of the Islamist sect Boko Haram, based in remote northeast Nigeria, as “foreign terrorist,” on June 20. But it declined to blacklist the entire organization to avoid elevating the group’s profile internationally. Police in Nigeria said members of the group seized a prison there Sunday and freed 40 inmates.
Islamist militant group al Shabaab is active in war-ravaged Somalia and has been blamed for attacks in Kenya. Last year it claimed responsibility for the death of Somali Interior Minister Abdi Shakur Sheikh Hassan.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an affiliate of al Qaeda based in North Africa, is mainly a criminal organization operating in the Sahel region. It kidnaps Westerners for ransom and aids Africa’s drug trade, according to intelligence officials.
Sunday, May 6, 2012
On The Rebound: Shining Path Factions Vie for Control of Upper Huallaga Valley
Via The Jamestown Foundation -
After the Peruvian army captured Comrade Artemio on February 12 and two potential successors on March 4 and April 3, President Ollanta Humala declared that the Shining Path was “totally defeated”—a prediction that is already proving to be premature. The Shining Path faction in the Upper Huallaga Valley retains a core group of loyal fighters capable of conducting military operations to pressure the government for Artemio’s release, but they are more dangerous for their apparent alliance with Movadef, a rising political movement that the government sees as a “front” for the Shining Path. Meanwhile, the 500-fighter faction of the Shining Path led by Comrade Jose in the VRAE has made clear its desire to expand its international narco-trafficking enterprise into the Upper Huallaga Valley and exploit the power vacuum with Artemio out of the picture. A takeover of the Upper Huallaga Valley would elevate Comrade Jose to the level of one of South America’s premier narco-trafficking bosses. Neither Shining Path faction is near surrender, and questions linger about whether President Humala’s new four-year anti-drug strategy underwritten by millions of dollars of U.S. aid will tame or enflame the country’s narco-trafficking insurgencies.
Background
The Shining Path consists of a 500-fighter faction in the River Apurimac and River Ene Valley (VRAE) led by Comrade Jose and a smaller 150-fighter faction in the Upper Huallaga Valley led until February 12 by Comrade Artemio. The VRAE and Upper Huallaga Valley factions split in 1999 after the capture of then leader Comrade Feliciano (Oscar Ramirez Durand). Comrade Artemio succeeded Feliciano in 1999 and remained loyal to Shining Path founder, Abimael Guzman (Chairman Gonzalo), who was captured in 1992. After Feliciano’s capture, Comrade Jose’s faction disavowed the Shining Path of Guzman, Feliciano and Artemio, who they criticized for alienating the campesinos during the war against the State in 1980s and for offering truces to the government once Guzman was captured.
Both factions officially espouse turning Peru into a Marxist state, but they depend on their capitalist narco-trafficking enterprises for financial survival. It is no coincidence that the two surviving factions of the once 15,000-fighter Shining Path operate in the country’s two main coca producing regions—the VRAE and the Upper Huallaga Valley, which produce 75% of Peru’s coca. With Peru expected to surpass Colombia as the world’s largest coca producer (61,200 hectares) in 2012, both factions stand to benefit.
[...]
Conclusion
The capture of Comrade Artemio has weakened his faction, but a core group of his fighters continue to engage in shows of military force to support Movadef’s political goals. There appears to be a low likelihood of a Shining Path merger considering that the two groups operate in distinct areas and harbor contrasting motivations. If Artemio’s faction continues to splinter, however, Jose’s faction may gain control of the major drug trafficking routes in the Upper Huallaga Valley and revive the Shining Path under a model like the FARC—a drug cartel with a nominal Marxist ideology. Both Shining Path factions benefit from the country’s increasing coca production, while they are also capable attracting recruits from the cocaleros if the drug eradication plan moves forward. The drug war can only be won if the cocaleros are provided with a substitute to growing coca, but historically the state has struggled to meet this need.
After the capture of Abimael Guzman in 1992, then President Fujimori said, “Sendero has been defeated. I defeated it.” Twenty years later, President Humala shows similar optimism, but the events on the ground suggest that both Shining Path factions will adapt to the realities on the ground after Artemio’s picture and implement new strategies in order to survive.
------------------------------------------------------------
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shining_Path
After the Peruvian army captured Comrade Artemio on February 12 and two potential successors on March 4 and April 3, President Ollanta Humala declared that the Shining Path was “totally defeated”—a prediction that is already proving to be premature. The Shining Path faction in the Upper Huallaga Valley retains a core group of loyal fighters capable of conducting military operations to pressure the government for Artemio’s release, but they are more dangerous for their apparent alliance with Movadef, a rising political movement that the government sees as a “front” for the Shining Path. Meanwhile, the 500-fighter faction of the Shining Path led by Comrade Jose in the VRAE has made clear its desire to expand its international narco-trafficking enterprise into the Upper Huallaga Valley and exploit the power vacuum with Artemio out of the picture. A takeover of the Upper Huallaga Valley would elevate Comrade Jose to the level of one of South America’s premier narco-trafficking bosses. Neither Shining Path faction is near surrender, and questions linger about whether President Humala’s new four-year anti-drug strategy underwritten by millions of dollars of U.S. aid will tame or enflame the country’s narco-trafficking insurgencies.
Background
The Shining Path consists of a 500-fighter faction in the River Apurimac and River Ene Valley (VRAE) led by Comrade Jose and a smaller 150-fighter faction in the Upper Huallaga Valley led until February 12 by Comrade Artemio. The VRAE and Upper Huallaga Valley factions split in 1999 after the capture of then leader Comrade Feliciano (Oscar Ramirez Durand). Comrade Artemio succeeded Feliciano in 1999 and remained loyal to Shining Path founder, Abimael Guzman (Chairman Gonzalo), who was captured in 1992. After Feliciano’s capture, Comrade Jose’s faction disavowed the Shining Path of Guzman, Feliciano and Artemio, who they criticized for alienating the campesinos during the war against the State in 1980s and for offering truces to the government once Guzman was captured.
Both factions officially espouse turning Peru into a Marxist state, but they depend on their capitalist narco-trafficking enterprises for financial survival. It is no coincidence that the two surviving factions of the once 15,000-fighter Shining Path operate in the country’s two main coca producing regions—the VRAE and the Upper Huallaga Valley, which produce 75% of Peru’s coca. With Peru expected to surpass Colombia as the world’s largest coca producer (61,200 hectares) in 2012, both factions stand to benefit.
[...]
Conclusion
The capture of Comrade Artemio has weakened his faction, but a core group of his fighters continue to engage in shows of military force to support Movadef’s political goals. There appears to be a low likelihood of a Shining Path merger considering that the two groups operate in distinct areas and harbor contrasting motivations. If Artemio’s faction continues to splinter, however, Jose’s faction may gain control of the major drug trafficking routes in the Upper Huallaga Valley and revive the Shining Path under a model like the FARC—a drug cartel with a nominal Marxist ideology. Both Shining Path factions benefit from the country’s increasing coca production, while they are also capable attracting recruits from the cocaleros if the drug eradication plan moves forward. The drug war can only be won if the cocaleros are provided with a substitute to growing coca, but historically the state has struggled to meet this need.
After the capture of Abimael Guzman in 1992, then President Fujimori said, “Sendero has been defeated. I defeated it.” Twenty years later, President Humala shows similar optimism, but the events on the ground suggest that both Shining Path factions will adapt to the realities on the ground after Artemio’s picture and implement new strategies in order to survive.
------------------------------------------------------------
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shining_Path
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso in Spanish) is a Maoist guerrilla insurgent organization in Peru. It prefers to be called the "Communist Party of Peru" or "PCP" for short. The Shining Path's ideology and tactics have been influential on other Maoist insurgent groups, notably the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and other Revolutionary Internationalist Movement-affiliated organizations. Widely condemned for its brutality, including violence deployed against peasants, trade union organizers, popularly elected officials and the general civilian population, the Shining Path is described by the Peruvian government as a terrorist organization. The group is on the U.S. Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and the European Union and Canada likewise describe it as a terrorist organization and prohibit providing funding or other financial support.
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
US Experts To Help Decrypt 'FARC' Computers
Via ColombiaReports.com (23 April 2012) -
A team of U.S. computer experts has arrived in Colombia to help national authorities recover information from the computer of deceased FARC leader "Alfonso Cano," reported Colombian newspaper El Espectador Monday.
Investigators with the Prosecutor General's office are working to break encryption codes on seven computers, 38 USB sticks and 24 hard drives recovered after a military bombing killed Cano in November, 2011.
The technology was retrieved from a FARC camp after the attack in Suarez, a town in the southwestern Cauca department.
The heavily-encrypted data uses four languages and multiple passwords, and requires the "meticulous" skills of the U.S. team to salvage and analyze it.
Investigators have already recovered some information from Cano's computer, including a plan to attack five army air bases with remote controlled helicopters.
----------------------------------------------------
Some of the 'plans' may be more aspirational, than operational ;)
A team of U.S. computer experts has arrived in Colombia to help national authorities recover information from the computer of deceased FARC leader "Alfonso Cano," reported Colombian newspaper El Espectador Monday.
Investigators with the Prosecutor General's office are working to break encryption codes on seven computers, 38 USB sticks and 24 hard drives recovered after a military bombing killed Cano in November, 2011.
The technology was retrieved from a FARC camp after the attack in Suarez, a town in the southwestern Cauca department.
The heavily-encrypted data uses four languages and multiple passwords, and requires the "meticulous" skills of the U.S. team to salvage and analyze it.
Investigators have already recovered some information from Cano's computer, including a plan to attack five army air bases with remote controlled helicopters.
----------------------------------------------------
Some of the 'plans' may be more aspirational, than operational ;)
Thursday, March 8, 2012
U.S. Says Iranian General Key in Afghan Heroin Trade
Via Al Arabiya News (Saudi-owned new organization) -
Washington on Wednesday named a general in Iran’s elite al-Quds force as a key figure in trafficking heroin from Afghanistan.
The U.S. Treasury designated Gen. Gholamreza Baghbani, who runs the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds force office in Zahedan near the Afghan-Pakistan border, as a narcotics “kingpin” for facilitating Aghan drugrunners to move opiates into and through Iran.
In return, the smugglers helped move weapons for the Taliban from Iran “on behalf of Baghbani,” the Treasury said in a statement.
It said that Baghbani had also aided the smuggling of chemicals used to make heroin through the Iranian border into Afghanistan.
He was the first Iranian to be officially named as a “specially designated narcotics trafficker” under the US “Kingpin Act”, which allows the Treasury to prohibit any US citizens or entities from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with the named individual.
Treasury said that the designation of Baghbani “exposes (the Quds force’s) involvement in trafficking narcotics, made doubly reprehensible here because it is done as part of a broader scheme to support terrorism.”
The Quds force is the shadowy special operations unit of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards and often operates outside of Iran.
----------------------------------------------------
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1444.aspx
Washington on Wednesday named a general in Iran’s elite al-Quds force as a key figure in trafficking heroin from Afghanistan.
The U.S. Treasury designated Gen. Gholamreza Baghbani, who runs the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds force office in Zahedan near the Afghan-Pakistan border, as a narcotics “kingpin” for facilitating Aghan drugrunners to move opiates into and through Iran.
In return, the smugglers helped move weapons for the Taliban from Iran “on behalf of Baghbani,” the Treasury said in a statement.
It said that Baghbani had also aided the smuggling of chemicals used to make heroin through the Iranian border into Afghanistan.
He was the first Iranian to be officially named as a “specially designated narcotics trafficker” under the US “Kingpin Act”, which allows the Treasury to prohibit any US citizens or entities from engaging in commercial or financial transactions with the named individual.
Treasury said that the designation of Baghbani “exposes (the Quds force’s) involvement in trafficking narcotics, made doubly reprehensible here because it is done as part of a broader scheme to support terrorism.”
The Quds force is the shadowy special operations unit of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards and often operates outside of Iran.
----------------------------------------------------
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1444.aspx
The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF) General Gholamreza Baghbani as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act). This is the first use of the Kingpin Act against an Iranian official.
Sunday, February 26, 2012
Charcoal is Fueling Al Shabaab
Via CNN's Security Clearance Blog (Feb 23, 2012) -
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has arrived in London to attend a conference that will focus on how the international community can help stabilize the chaotic situation in Somalia. One issue getting attention – the role of charcoal.
A British sponsored resolution, currently making its way through the United Nations Security Council, aims to expand the current amount of troops in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia, and to expand their mandate to work beyond the Somali capital of Somalia. It also calls for a ban on charcoal out of Somalia because such exports have been used by al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda linked terrorist group in Somalia, as a means to finance their operations.
“Much of the charcoal that flows out of south central Somalia is either taxed or owned by al-Shabaab’” a senior State Department official told reporters traveling aboard Clinton’s plane as it flew to London from the United States. “When charcoal flows out to Yemen, to Saudi Arabia, to places in the Gulf, al-Shabaab is able to tax this charcoal and to gain the resources from it.”
In addition to choking off a source for al-Shabaab coffers, the State Department says the charcoal ban would "help protect the very fragile ecological balance," in the southern part of Somalia.
----------------------------------------
Recently, al Shabaab (and it's affiliate in Kenya) officially merged with al Qaeda, forming al Qaeda East Africa (AQAE).
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has arrived in London to attend a conference that will focus on how the international community can help stabilize the chaotic situation in Somalia. One issue getting attention – the role of charcoal.
A British sponsored resolution, currently making its way through the United Nations Security Council, aims to expand the current amount of troops in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia, and to expand their mandate to work beyond the Somali capital of Somalia. It also calls for a ban on charcoal out of Somalia because such exports have been used by al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda linked terrorist group in Somalia, as a means to finance their operations.
“Much of the charcoal that flows out of south central Somalia is either taxed or owned by al-Shabaab’” a senior State Department official told reporters traveling aboard Clinton’s plane as it flew to London from the United States. “When charcoal flows out to Yemen, to Saudi Arabia, to places in the Gulf, al-Shabaab is able to tax this charcoal and to gain the resources from it.”
In addition to choking off a source for al-Shabaab coffers, the State Department says the charcoal ban would "help protect the very fragile ecological balance," in the southern part of Somalia.
----------------------------------------
Recently, al Shabaab (and it's affiliate in Kenya) officially merged with al Qaeda, forming al Qaeda East Africa (AQAE).
Wednesday, February 15, 2012
Al Qaeda's Merger
Via Foreign Policy -
Hundreds of Somalis gathered on the outskirts of Mogadishu on Feb. 13 to celebrate the union of al Qaeda with its Somali cousin, the insurgent-terrorist group al-Shabab. But the mainstream media hasn't quite figured out what to make of the news, first announced last week, that the two groups had officially merged.
They might have done better with a simple headline: "Dozens of Americans Join al Qaeda."
The disturbing truth is that al-Shabab has had more success recruiting Americans than any of al Qaeda's other franchises. The newest official addition to the terrorist network's family includes around 40 Americans, in addition to dozens more involved in support activities on U.S. soil, as well as those with more casual connections to the United States. That support network dwarfs the American presence in "al Qaeda Central," which was largely terminated after the 9/11 attacks.
Al-Shabab's numbers and its extensive support network mean al Qaeda is now better positioned to carry out strikes on the U.S. homeland than at any point in the last 10 years. The majority of al-Shabab's American recruits are ethnic Somalis -- first- and second-generation immigrants with still-fresh ties to their ancestral home -- but the group also enjoys significant support from radicalized Muslim converts from diverse backgrounds, who are attracted by its efforts to carve out a domain ruled by a harsh interpretation of Islamic law.
Hundreds of Somalis gathered on the outskirts of Mogadishu on Feb. 13 to celebrate the union of al Qaeda with its Somali cousin, the insurgent-terrorist group al-Shabab. But the mainstream media hasn't quite figured out what to make of the news, first announced last week, that the two groups had officially merged.
They might have done better with a simple headline: "Dozens of Americans Join al Qaeda."
The disturbing truth is that al-Shabab has had more success recruiting Americans than any of al Qaeda's other franchises. The newest official addition to the terrorist network's family includes around 40 Americans, in addition to dozens more involved in support activities on U.S. soil, as well as those with more casual connections to the United States. That support network dwarfs the American presence in "al Qaeda Central," which was largely terminated after the 9/11 attacks.
Al-Shabab's numbers and its extensive support network mean al Qaeda is now better positioned to carry out strikes on the U.S. homeland than at any point in the last 10 years. The majority of al-Shabab's American recruits are ethnic Somalis -- first- and second-generation immigrants with still-fresh ties to their ancestral home -- but the group also enjoys significant support from radicalized Muslim converts from diverse backgrounds, who are attracted by its efforts to carve out a domain ruled by a harsh interpretation of Islamic law.
Saturday, February 11, 2012
Somalia's al-Shabaab Joins al-Qaeda
Via BBC (10 February) -
Islamist militant group al-Shabab, which controls much of Somalia, has released a joint video with al-Qaeda, announcing the two groups have merged. Al-Shabab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair, said he "pledged obedience" to al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri. The two groups have long worked together and foreigners are known to fight alongside Somali militants.
The announcement comes as al-Shabab is under pressure on several fronts. Africa Union troops supporting the forces of the UN-backed government have taken control of the capital, Mogadishu, while both Kenya and Ethiopia have sent forces into Somalia to push back the Islamists. Al-Shabab, however, still controls many southern and central areas of the country.
However, correspondents say al-Shabab's policy of banning many foreign aid agencies from areas it controls during the region's worst drought in 60 years has lost the group some of its popular support. The United Nations says that although the famine in Somalia is officially over, a third of the population still needs urgent feeding.
BBC Somali editor Yusuf Garaad Omar says the merger of al-Shabab and al-Qaeda has the potential to change the dynamics of the conflict in Somalia.During the 15-minute Arabic-language video posted on jihadist websites, Zawahiri said the move was "good news" for al-Qaeda.
Analysts say the announcement helps boost al-Qaeda after its leader Osama Bin Laden was killed last year.
-------------------------------
This CFR Backgrounder provides a profile of the al-Shabaab Islamist militant organization based in southern Somalia.
Islamist militant group al-Shabab, which controls much of Somalia, has released a joint video with al-Qaeda, announcing the two groups have merged. Al-Shabab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair, said he "pledged obedience" to al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri. The two groups have long worked together and foreigners are known to fight alongside Somali militants.
The announcement comes as al-Shabab is under pressure on several fronts. Africa Union troops supporting the forces of the UN-backed government have taken control of the capital, Mogadishu, while both Kenya and Ethiopia have sent forces into Somalia to push back the Islamists. Al-Shabab, however, still controls many southern and central areas of the country.
However, correspondents say al-Shabab's policy of banning many foreign aid agencies from areas it controls during the region's worst drought in 60 years has lost the group some of its popular support. The United Nations says that although the famine in Somalia is officially over, a third of the population still needs urgent feeding.
BBC Somali editor Yusuf Garaad Omar says the merger of al-Shabab and al-Qaeda has the potential to change the dynamics of the conflict in Somalia.During the 15-minute Arabic-language video posted on jihadist websites, Zawahiri said the move was "good news" for al-Qaeda.
Analysts say the announcement helps boost al-Qaeda after its leader Osama Bin Laden was killed last year.
-------------------------------
This CFR Backgrounder provides a profile of the al-Shabaab Islamist militant organization based in southern Somalia.
Saturday, January 28, 2012
How Pakistan Helps the U.S. Drone Campaign
Via Reuters (Jan 22, 2012) -
The death of a senior al Qaeda leader in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan's tribal badlands, the first strike in almost two months, signaled that the U.S.-Pakistan intelligence partnership is still in operation despite political tensions.
The Jan 10 strike -- and its follow-up two days later -- were joint operations, a Pakistani security source based in the tribal areas told Reuters.
They made use of Pakistani "spotters" on the ground and demonstrated a level of coordination that both sides have sought to downplay since tensions erupted in January 2011 with the killing of two Pakistanis by a CIA contractor in Lahore.
"Our working relationship is a bit different from our political relationship," the source told Reuters, requesting anonymity. "It's more productive."
U.S. and Pakistani sources told Reuters that the target of the Jan 10 attack was Aslam Awan, a Pakistani national from Abbottabad, the town where Osama bin Laden was killed last May by a U.S. commando team.
[...]
The Pakistani source, who helped target Awan, could not confirm that he was killed, but the U.S. official said he was. European officials said Awan had spent time in London and had ties to British extremists before returning to Pakistan.
The source, who says he runs a network of spotters primarily in North and South Waziristan, described for the first time how U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on strikes works, with his Pakistani agents keeping close tabs on suspected militants and building a pattern of their movements and associations.
"We run a network of human intelligence sources," he said. "Separately, we monitor their cell and satellite phones.
"Thirdly, we run joint monitoring operations with our U.S. and UK friends," he added, noting that cooperation with British intelligence was also extensive.
Pakistani and U.S. intelligence officers, using their own sources, hash out a joint "priority of targets lists" in regular face-to-face meetings, he said.
"Al Qaeda is our top priority," he said.
He declined to say where the meetings take place.
Once a target is identified and "marked," his network coordinates with drone operators on the U.S. side. He said the United States bases drones outside Kabul, likely at Bagram airfield about 25 miles north of the capital.
From spotting to firing a missile "hardly takes about two to three hours," he said.
It was impossible to verify the source's claims and American experts, who decline to discuss the drone program, say the Pakistanis' cooperation has been less helpful in the past.
U.S. officials have complained that when information on drone strikes was shared with the Pakistanis beforehand, the targets were often tipped off, allowing them to escape.
The death of a senior al Qaeda leader in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan's tribal badlands, the first strike in almost two months, signaled that the U.S.-Pakistan intelligence partnership is still in operation despite political tensions.
The Jan 10 strike -- and its follow-up two days later -- were joint operations, a Pakistani security source based in the tribal areas told Reuters.
They made use of Pakistani "spotters" on the ground and demonstrated a level of coordination that both sides have sought to downplay since tensions erupted in January 2011 with the killing of two Pakistanis by a CIA contractor in Lahore.
"Our working relationship is a bit different from our political relationship," the source told Reuters, requesting anonymity. "It's more productive."
U.S. and Pakistani sources told Reuters that the target of the Jan 10 attack was Aslam Awan, a Pakistani national from Abbottabad, the town where Osama bin Laden was killed last May by a U.S. commando team.
[...]
The Pakistani source, who helped target Awan, could not confirm that he was killed, but the U.S. official said he was. European officials said Awan had spent time in London and had ties to British extremists before returning to Pakistan.
The source, who says he runs a network of spotters primarily in North and South Waziristan, described for the first time how U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on strikes works, with his Pakistani agents keeping close tabs on suspected militants and building a pattern of their movements and associations.
"We run a network of human intelligence sources," he said. "Separately, we monitor their cell and satellite phones.
"Thirdly, we run joint monitoring operations with our U.S. and UK friends," he added, noting that cooperation with British intelligence was also extensive.
Pakistani and U.S. intelligence officers, using their own sources, hash out a joint "priority of targets lists" in regular face-to-face meetings, he said.
"Al Qaeda is our top priority," he said.
He declined to say where the meetings take place.
Once a target is identified and "marked," his network coordinates with drone operators on the U.S. side. He said the United States bases drones outside Kabul, likely at Bagram airfield about 25 miles north of the capital.
From spotting to firing a missile "hardly takes about two to three hours," he said.
It was impossible to verify the source's claims and American experts, who decline to discuss the drone program, say the Pakistanis' cooperation has been less helpful in the past.
U.S. officials have complained that when information on drone strikes was shared with the Pakistanis beforehand, the targets were often tipped off, allowing them to escape.
Thursday, January 19, 2012
A Hezbollah Threat in Thailand?
Via STRATFOR (Security Weekly) -
On Jan. 12, Thai authorities arrested a man they say was a member of the Lebanon-based Shiite militant group Hezbollah who was plotting an attack in Bangkok. In uncovering the plot, Thai police cite cooperation with the United States and Israel going back to December 2011. Bangkok is indeed a target-rich environment with a history of terrorist attacks, but today Hezbollah and other militant and criminal groups rely on the city as more of a business hub than anything else. If Hezbollah or some other transnational militant group were to carry out an attack in the city, it would have to be for a compelling reason that outweighed the costs.
[...]
While there are certainly plenty of U.S., Jewish and Israeli targets in Thailand in general and Bangkok in particular, other officials have given different accounts of the alleged plot that add more nuance. According to National Police Chief Priewpan Damapong, Hussein insisted that the materials seized were not intended for attacks in Thailand but were going to be transported to a yet-to-be-named third country (a Stratfor source has cited the Philippines as a logical destination). He also allegedly told authorities that, although he was a member of Hezbollah, he was not a member of the group's militant arm. A Hezbollah official in Beirut, Ghaleb Abu Zainab, told the Lebanese Broadcasting Corp. that Hussein was not a Hezbollah member, while Stratfor sources have told us that he was. Our sources also have confirmed Hussein's reported confession to police that he was on the business side of things -- likely involved in procurement and logistics -- rather than the militant side, which involves such things as bombmaking or operational planning. As a Swedish passport holder, Hussein would have much more access to business connections, so it makes sense that Hezbollah would want to compartmentalize his skills.
[...]
Thus, Hezbollah's profile and set of interests support Hussein's reported claims that the bombmaking materials that police found were being moved out of the country and were not intended for use in Bangkok or other tourist locations in Thailand.
[...]
Just as Bangkok is an attractive business hub in Southeast Asia for legitimate businessmen, it is also an attractive hub for illicit businessmen. In 2008, Thai police arrested Russian arms smuggler Viktor Bout after agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, posing as members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrilla group trying to negotiate a deal to buy weapons, incriminated Bout during a meeting in Bangkok. It appears that Hussein's role in this case would have been an administrative one similar to Bout's: sourcing the fertilizer, finding a place to stockpile it and concealing it in innocent-looking fan boxes. This would not make him any less guilty of assisting a militant group, but it would deflate the theory that Hezbollah was plotting to use this material in an immediate attack in Bangkok.
This is not to say that Hezbollah or some other militant group will not conduct an attack in Bangkok in the future. But it would take a lot to convince group leaders that the financial pain of an attack in the city would be worth the ideological gain. And the recent alleged plot should remind investigators and policymakers to remember the financial bottom line as well as the ideological bottom line when assessing future terrorist threats.
On Jan. 12, Thai authorities arrested a man they say was a member of the Lebanon-based Shiite militant group Hezbollah who was plotting an attack in Bangkok. In uncovering the plot, Thai police cite cooperation with the United States and Israel going back to December 2011. Bangkok is indeed a target-rich environment with a history of terrorist attacks, but today Hezbollah and other militant and criminal groups rely on the city as more of a business hub than anything else. If Hezbollah or some other transnational militant group were to carry out an attack in the city, it would have to be for a compelling reason that outweighed the costs.
[...]
While there are certainly plenty of U.S., Jewish and Israeli targets in Thailand in general and Bangkok in particular, other officials have given different accounts of the alleged plot that add more nuance. According to National Police Chief Priewpan Damapong, Hussein insisted that the materials seized were not intended for attacks in Thailand but were going to be transported to a yet-to-be-named third country (a Stratfor source has cited the Philippines as a logical destination). He also allegedly told authorities that, although he was a member of Hezbollah, he was not a member of the group's militant arm. A Hezbollah official in Beirut, Ghaleb Abu Zainab, told the Lebanese Broadcasting Corp. that Hussein was not a Hezbollah member, while Stratfor sources have told us that he was. Our sources also have confirmed Hussein's reported confession to police that he was on the business side of things -- likely involved in procurement and logistics -- rather than the militant side, which involves such things as bombmaking or operational planning. As a Swedish passport holder, Hussein would have much more access to business connections, so it makes sense that Hezbollah would want to compartmentalize his skills.
[...]
Thus, Hezbollah's profile and set of interests support Hussein's reported claims that the bombmaking materials that police found were being moved out of the country and were not intended for use in Bangkok or other tourist locations in Thailand.
[...]
Just as Bangkok is an attractive business hub in Southeast Asia for legitimate businessmen, it is also an attractive hub for illicit businessmen. In 2008, Thai police arrested Russian arms smuggler Viktor Bout after agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, posing as members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrilla group trying to negotiate a deal to buy weapons, incriminated Bout during a meeting in Bangkok. It appears that Hussein's role in this case would have been an administrative one similar to Bout's: sourcing the fertilizer, finding a place to stockpile it and concealing it in innocent-looking fan boxes. This would not make him any less guilty of assisting a militant group, but it would deflate the theory that Hezbollah was plotting to use this material in an immediate attack in Bangkok.
This is not to say that Hezbollah or some other militant group will not conduct an attack in Bangkok in the future. But it would take a lot to convince group leaders that the financial pain of an attack in the city would be worth the ideological gain. And the recent alleged plot should remind investigators and policymakers to remember the financial bottom line as well as the ideological bottom line when assessing future terrorist threats.
Saturday, January 14, 2012
False Flag
Via Foreign Policy -
Buried deep in the archives of America's intelligence services are a series of memos, written during the last years of President George W. Bush's administration, that describe how Israeli Mossad officers recruited operatives belonging to the terrorist group Jundallah by passing themselves off as American agents. According to two U.S. intelligence officials, the Israelis, flush with American dollars and toting U.S. passports, posed as CIA officers in recruiting Jundallah operatives -- what is commonly referred to as a "false flag" operation.
The memos, as described by the sources, one of whom has read them and another who is intimately familiar with the case, investigated and debunked reports from 2007 and 2008 accusing the CIA, at the direction of the White House, of covertly supporting Jundallah -- a Pakistan-based Sunni extremist organization. Jundallah, according to the U.S. government and published reports, is responsible for assassinating Iranian government officials and killing Iranian women and children.
But while the memos show that the United States had barred even the most incidental contact with Jundallah, according to both intelligence officers, the same was not true for Israel's Mossad. The memos also detail CIA field reports saying that Israel's recruiting activities occurred under the nose of U.S. intelligence officers, most notably in London, the capital of one of Israel's ostensible allies, where Mossad officers posing as CIA operatives met with Jundallah officials.
The officials did not know whether the Israeli program to recruit and use Jundallah is ongoing. Nevertheless, they were stunned by the brazenness of the Mossad's efforts.
"It's amazing what the Israelis thought they could get away with," the intelligence officer said. "Their recruitment activities were nearly in the open. They apparently didn't give a damn what we thought.
Interviews with six currently serving or recently retired intelligence officers over the last 18 months have helped to fill in the blanks of the Israeli false-flag operation. In addition to the two currently serving U.S. intelligence officers, the existence of the Israeli false-flag operation was confirmed to me by four retired intelligence officers who have served in the CIA or have monitored Israeli intelligence operations from senior positions inside the U.S. government.
The CIA and the White House were both asked for comment on this story. By the time this story went to press, they had not responded. The Israeli intelligence services -- the Mossad -- were also contacted, in writing and by telephone, but failed to respond. As a policy, Israel does not confirm or deny its involvement in intelligence operations.
[...]
According to one retired CIA officer, information about the false-flag operation was reported up the U.S. intelligence chain of command. It reached CIA Director of Operations Stephen Kappes, his deputy Michael Sulick, and the head of the Counterintelligence Center. All three of these officials are now retired. The Counterintelligence Center, according to its website, is tasked with investigating "threats posed by foreign intelligence services."
The report then made its way to the White House, according to the currently serving U.S. intelligence officer. The officer said that Bush "went absolutely ballistic" when briefed on its contents.
"The report sparked White House concerns that Israel's program was putting Americans at risk," the intelligence officer told me. "There's no question that the U.S. has cooperated with Israel in intelligence-gathering operations against the Iranians, but this was different. No matter what anyone thinks, we're not in the business of assassinating Iranian officials or killing Iranian civilians."
[...]
The debate over Jundallah was resolved only after Bush left office when, within his first weeks as president, Barack Obama drastically scaled back joint U.S.-Israel intelligence programs targeting Iran, according to multiple serving and retired officers.
The decision was controversial inside the CIA, where officials were forced to shut down "some key intelligence-gathering operations," a recently retired CIA officer confirmed. This action was followed in November 2010 by the State Department's addition of Jundallah to its list of foreign terrorist organizations -- a decision that one former CIA officer called "an absolute no-brainer."
Since Obama's initial order, U.S. intelligence services have received clearance to cooperate with Israel on a number of classified intelligence-gathering operations focused on Iran's nuclear program, according to a currently serving officer. These operations are highly technical in nature and do not involve covert actions targeting Iran's infrastructure or political or military leadership.
"We don't do bang and boom," a recently retired intelligence officer said. "And we don't do political assassinations."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bombing Kills Iranian Nuclear Scientist
Jundallah (Soldiers of God)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jundallah
Buried deep in the archives of America's intelligence services are a series of memos, written during the last years of President George W. Bush's administration, that describe how Israeli Mossad officers recruited operatives belonging to the terrorist group Jundallah by passing themselves off as American agents. According to two U.S. intelligence officials, the Israelis, flush with American dollars and toting U.S. passports, posed as CIA officers in recruiting Jundallah operatives -- what is commonly referred to as a "false flag" operation.
The memos, as described by the sources, one of whom has read them and another who is intimately familiar with the case, investigated and debunked reports from 2007 and 2008 accusing the CIA, at the direction of the White House, of covertly supporting Jundallah -- a Pakistan-based Sunni extremist organization. Jundallah, according to the U.S. government and published reports, is responsible for assassinating Iranian government officials and killing Iranian women and children.
But while the memos show that the United States had barred even the most incidental contact with Jundallah, according to both intelligence officers, the same was not true for Israel's Mossad. The memos also detail CIA field reports saying that Israel's recruiting activities occurred under the nose of U.S. intelligence officers, most notably in London, the capital of one of Israel's ostensible allies, where Mossad officers posing as CIA operatives met with Jundallah officials.
The officials did not know whether the Israeli program to recruit and use Jundallah is ongoing. Nevertheless, they were stunned by the brazenness of the Mossad's efforts.
"It's amazing what the Israelis thought they could get away with," the intelligence officer said. "Their recruitment activities were nearly in the open. They apparently didn't give a damn what we thought.
Interviews with six currently serving or recently retired intelligence officers over the last 18 months have helped to fill in the blanks of the Israeli false-flag operation. In addition to the two currently serving U.S. intelligence officers, the existence of the Israeli false-flag operation was confirmed to me by four retired intelligence officers who have served in the CIA or have monitored Israeli intelligence operations from senior positions inside the U.S. government.
The CIA and the White House were both asked for comment on this story. By the time this story went to press, they had not responded. The Israeli intelligence services -- the Mossad -- were also contacted, in writing and by telephone, but failed to respond. As a policy, Israel does not confirm or deny its involvement in intelligence operations.
[...]
According to one retired CIA officer, information about the false-flag operation was reported up the U.S. intelligence chain of command. It reached CIA Director of Operations Stephen Kappes, his deputy Michael Sulick, and the head of the Counterintelligence Center. All three of these officials are now retired. The Counterintelligence Center, according to its website, is tasked with investigating "threats posed by foreign intelligence services."
The report then made its way to the White House, according to the currently serving U.S. intelligence officer. The officer said that Bush "went absolutely ballistic" when briefed on its contents.
"The report sparked White House concerns that Israel's program was putting Americans at risk," the intelligence officer told me. "There's no question that the U.S. has cooperated with Israel in intelligence-gathering operations against the Iranians, but this was different. No matter what anyone thinks, we're not in the business of assassinating Iranian officials or killing Iranian civilians."
[...]
The debate over Jundallah was resolved only after Bush left office when, within his first weeks as president, Barack Obama drastically scaled back joint U.S.-Israel intelligence programs targeting Iran, according to multiple serving and retired officers.
The decision was controversial inside the CIA, where officials were forced to shut down "some key intelligence-gathering operations," a recently retired CIA officer confirmed. This action was followed in November 2010 by the State Department's addition of Jundallah to its list of foreign terrorist organizations -- a decision that one former CIA officer called "an absolute no-brainer."
Since Obama's initial order, U.S. intelligence services have received clearance to cooperate with Israel on a number of classified intelligence-gathering operations focused on Iran's nuclear program, according to a currently serving officer. These operations are highly technical in nature and do not involve covert actions targeting Iran's infrastructure or political or military leadership.
"We don't do bang and boom," a recently retired intelligence officer said. "And we don't do political assassinations."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bombing Kills Iranian Nuclear Scientist
In response, the White House said it "had absolutely nothing to do'' with the blast that killed Roshan. White House spokesman Tommy Vietor said the U.S. strongly condemns the attack and all acts of violence.------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a joint press conference in Washington with the Qatari foreign minister, Hillary Clinton again denied U.S. involvement.
"I want to categorically deny any United States involvement in any kind of act of violence inside Iran," said Clinton.
Jundallah (Soldiers of God)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jundallah
Monday, January 9, 2012
Florida Resident Charged with Plotting to Bomb Locations in Tampa
Via FBI Press Release (Tampa Division) -
A 25-year-old resident of Pinellas Park, Fla., has been charged in connection with an alleged plot to attack locations in Tampa with a vehicle bomb, assault rifle, and other explosives, announced Robert E. O’Neill, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida; Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Steven E. Ibison, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Tampa Division.
Sami Osmakac, a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in the former Yugoslavia (Kosovo), was arrested Saturday night. He is charged in a criminal complaint in the Middle District of Florida with one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction (explosives) and is scheduled to make his initial appearance today at 2:00 p.m. EST, in federal court, before U.S. Magistrate Judge Anthony Porcelli, in Tampa. If convicted, Osmakac faces a maximum sentence of life in prison and a $250,000 fine.
The arrest of Osmakac was the culmination of an undercover operation during which Osmakac was closely monitored by law enforcement officials for several months. The explosives and firearms that he allegedly sought and attempted to use were rendered inoperable by law enforcement and posed no threat to the public.
[...]
According to the complaint affidavit, in Sept. 2011, the FBI received information from a confidential human source (CHS) indicating that Osmakac had asked for al Qaeda flags. In November 2011, Osmakac and the CHS discussed and identified potential targets, in Tampa, where Osmakac intended on carrying out violent attacks. Osmakac allegedly asked the CHS for help in obtaining firearms and explosives for the attacks. The CHS indicated that he/she knew someone who might be able to provide firearms and explosives and introduced Osmakac to an undercover FBI employee.
[...]
On Jan. 7, 2012, FBI agents arrested Osmakac after he took possession of the explosive devices and firearms that had been rendered inoperable by law enforcement. The complaint alleges that, shortly prior to his arrest, Osmakac made a video of himself explaining his motives for carrying out the planned violent attack.
This investigation is being conducted by the FBI Tampa Division and the Tampa Joint Terrorism Task Force. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Sara Sweeney from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida, with assistance from Trial Attorney Clem McGovern of the Counterterrorism Section in the Department of Justice’s National Security Division.
A 25-year-old resident of Pinellas Park, Fla., has been charged in connection with an alleged plot to attack locations in Tampa with a vehicle bomb, assault rifle, and other explosives, announced Robert E. O’Neill, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida; Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; and Steven E. Ibison, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Tampa Division.
Sami Osmakac, a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in the former Yugoslavia (Kosovo), was arrested Saturday night. He is charged in a criminal complaint in the Middle District of Florida with one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction (explosives) and is scheduled to make his initial appearance today at 2:00 p.m. EST, in federal court, before U.S. Magistrate Judge Anthony Porcelli, in Tampa. If convicted, Osmakac faces a maximum sentence of life in prison and a $250,000 fine.
The arrest of Osmakac was the culmination of an undercover operation during which Osmakac was closely monitored by law enforcement officials for several months. The explosives and firearms that he allegedly sought and attempted to use were rendered inoperable by law enforcement and posed no threat to the public.
[...]
According to the complaint affidavit, in Sept. 2011, the FBI received information from a confidential human source (CHS) indicating that Osmakac had asked for al Qaeda flags. In November 2011, Osmakac and the CHS discussed and identified potential targets, in Tampa, where Osmakac intended on carrying out violent attacks. Osmakac allegedly asked the CHS for help in obtaining firearms and explosives for the attacks. The CHS indicated that he/she knew someone who might be able to provide firearms and explosives and introduced Osmakac to an undercover FBI employee.
[...]
On Jan. 7, 2012, FBI agents arrested Osmakac after he took possession of the explosive devices and firearms that had been rendered inoperable by law enforcement. The complaint alleges that, shortly prior to his arrest, Osmakac made a video of himself explaining his motives for carrying out the planned violent attack.
This investigation is being conducted by the FBI Tampa Division and the Tampa Joint Terrorism Task Force. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Sara Sweeney from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida, with assistance from Trial Attorney Clem McGovern of the Counterterrorism Section in the Department of Justice’s National Security Division.
Thursday, December 29, 2011
Terrorists Struggle To Gain Recruits On The Web
Via NPR -
Terrorist groups seemed to be all over the Web in 2011. There were al-Qaida videos on YouTube, Facebook pages by Islamic militants in Somalia, and webzines – like Inspire magazine – produced by al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen.
If there were an award for the best known terrorist music recording in the past couple of years, it would probably go to the Somali militia group al-Shabab for a YouTube video that extolled the virtues of jihad, or holy war.
The tune became so popular it was actually covered by other aspiring violent jihadis, who added hip-hop beats and rap lyrics.
The Shabab music video caught the attention of U.S. counter-terrorism officials. They saw it as dangerous because it was slick and catchy and in English. The video ignited an effort in Washington to figure out how to counter the use of social media among terrorist groups.
What no one is saying, however, is that the effort to use social media sites like Facebook and YouTube, and even Twitter, hasn't been the recruitment boon that terrorist organizations had been hoping for.
Terrorist groups appear to be still working out the kinks in their new media strategy and concerns about terrorists and social media may be overblown.
"The worry in official Washington has been that kids are going to be attracted by its message and that they are going to spontaneously arise and become terrorists," said Will McCants, an analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis. "But we just haven't seen the numbers to suggest that that's true. Before social media, after social media... it is just a trickle of individuals who get involved in terrorist activities."
McCants says U.S. officials — perhaps because they don't use social media on a regular basis — may see it as a larger menace than it actually is.
[...]
One of the early players in jihadi social media was a radical Islamic organization called Revolution Muslim. Based in New York, the group's founders claimed that the RevMuslim blog received 1,500 hits a day. Its YouTube channel had some 1,000 subscribers. The group was open about its goals to establish Islamic law in the U.S., destroy Israel, and take al-Qaeda's messages to the masses.
Revolution Muslim became like a gateway drug for young men, enabling those who might be just tangentially interested in the global jihad to link up with real jihadists in Pakistan and other places.
[...]
There is one part of government that has learned to exploit the intersection of terrorism and the web: law enforcement.
The New York Police Department and FBI never shut the Revolution Muslim website down because it provided leads on young men who were inclined toward violent extremism. Now law enforcement can go to Facebook to provide the same kind of intelligence.
"I have been very surprised by the number of people who are moving to Facebook who are talking openly about their admiration for al-Qaeda," said CNA's McCants. "This can be a great boon for law enforcement because you can watch the flow of propaganda and you can see who is connecting to whom and if they are getting in the orbit of very dangerous people."
Al-Shabab, the Islamist militia that produced that popular music video, now has a Twitter account with thousands of followers. The joke among terrorism experts? About 99 percent of them are journalists and law enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://twitter.com/#!/will_mccants/status/152488334629941248
=)
Terrorist groups seemed to be all over the Web in 2011. There were al-Qaida videos on YouTube, Facebook pages by Islamic militants in Somalia, and webzines – like Inspire magazine – produced by al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen.
If there were an award for the best known terrorist music recording in the past couple of years, it would probably go to the Somali militia group al-Shabab for a YouTube video that extolled the virtues of jihad, or holy war.
The tune became so popular it was actually covered by other aspiring violent jihadis, who added hip-hop beats and rap lyrics.
The Shabab music video caught the attention of U.S. counter-terrorism officials. They saw it as dangerous because it was slick and catchy and in English. The video ignited an effort in Washington to figure out how to counter the use of social media among terrorist groups.
What no one is saying, however, is that the effort to use social media sites like Facebook and YouTube, and even Twitter, hasn't been the recruitment boon that terrorist organizations had been hoping for.
Terrorist groups appear to be still working out the kinks in their new media strategy and concerns about terrorists and social media may be overblown.
"The worry in official Washington has been that kids are going to be attracted by its message and that they are going to spontaneously arise and become terrorists," said Will McCants, an analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis. "But we just haven't seen the numbers to suggest that that's true. Before social media, after social media... it is just a trickle of individuals who get involved in terrorist activities."
McCants says U.S. officials — perhaps because they don't use social media on a regular basis — may see it as a larger menace than it actually is.
[...]
One of the early players in jihadi social media was a radical Islamic organization called Revolution Muslim. Based in New York, the group's founders claimed that the RevMuslim blog received 1,500 hits a day. Its YouTube channel had some 1,000 subscribers. The group was open about its goals to establish Islamic law in the U.S., destroy Israel, and take al-Qaeda's messages to the masses.
Revolution Muslim became like a gateway drug for young men, enabling those who might be just tangentially interested in the global jihad to link up with real jihadists in Pakistan and other places.
[...]
There is one part of government that has learned to exploit the intersection of terrorism and the web: law enforcement.
The New York Police Department and FBI never shut the Revolution Muslim website down because it provided leads on young men who were inclined toward violent extremism. Now law enforcement can go to Facebook to provide the same kind of intelligence.
"I have been very surprised by the number of people who are moving to Facebook who are talking openly about their admiration for al-Qaeda," said CNA's McCants. "This can be a great boon for law enforcement because you can watch the flow of propaganda and you can see who is connecting to whom and if they are getting in the orbit of very dangerous people."
Al-Shabab, the Islamist militia that produced that popular music video, now has a Twitter account with thousands of followers. The joke among terrorism experts? About 99 percent of them are journalists and law enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://twitter.com/#!/will_mccants/status/152488334629941248
Just heard some guy in radio promo for NPR segment today. I thought "Why is he speaking so slowly? Holy shit, thats me!"
=)
Thursday, December 22, 2011
Former Pakistan Army Chief Reveals Intelligence Bureau Harbored Bin Laden in Abbottabad
Via The Jamestown Foundation -
In spite of denials by the Pakistani military, evidence is emerging that elements within the Pakistani military harbored Osama bin Laden with the knowledge of former army chief General Pervez Musharraf and possibly current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. Former Pakistani Army Chief General Ziauddin Butt (a.k.a. General Ziauddin Khawaja) revealed at a conference on Pakistani-U.S. relations in October 2011 that according to his knowledge the then former Director-General of Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan (2004 – 2008), Brigadier Ijaz Shah (Retd.), had kept Osama bin Laden in an Intelligence Bureau safe house in Abbottabad. In the same address, he revealed that the ISI had helped the CIA to track him down and kill on May 1. The revelation remained unreported for some time because some intelligence officers had asked journalists to refrain from publishing General Butt’s remarks. [1] No mention of the charges appeared until right-wing columnist Altaf Hassan Qureshi referred to them in an Urdu-language article that appeared on December 8.
In a subsequent and revealing Urdu-language interview with TV channel Dawn News, General Butt repeated the allegation on December 11, saying he fully believed that “[Brigadier] Ijaz Shah had kept this man [Bin Laden in the Abbottabad compound] with the full knowledge of General Pervez Musharraf… Ijaz Shah was an all-powerful official in the government of General Musharraf.” Asked whether General Kayani knew of this, he first said yes, but later reconsidered: “[Kayani] may have known – I do not know – he might not have known.” The general’s remarks appeared to confirm investigations by this author in May 2011 that showed that the Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was captured and killed was being used by a Pakistani intelligence agency. However, General Butt failed to explain why Bin Laden was not discovered even after Brigadier Shah and General Musharraf had left the government.
General Butt was the first head of the Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistan army and the Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1990 to 1993, and again from 1997 to 1999. Sharif promoted General Ziauddin Butt to COAS after forcibly retiring General Pervez Musharraf on October 12, 1999, but the army’s top brass revolted against the decision and arrested both Prime Minister Sharif and General Butt while installing Musharraf as the nation’s new chief executive, a post he kept as a chief U.S. ally until resigning in 2008 in the face of an impending impeachment procedure.
Brigadier Shah has been known or is alleged to have been involved in several high profile cases of terrorism. The Brigadier was heading the ISI bureau in Lahore when General Musharraf overthrew Prime Minister Sharif in October 1999. Later, General Musharraf appointed Shah as Home Secretary in Punjab. As an ISI officer he was also the handler for Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was involved in the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002. Omar Saeed Sheikh surrendered to Brigadier Shah who hid him for several weeks before turning him over to authorities. In February 2004, Musharraf appointed Shah as the new Director of the Intelligence Bureau, a post he kept until March 2008 (Daily Times [Lahore] February 26, 2004; Dawn [Karachi] March 18, 2008). The late Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto accused Brigadier Shah, among others, of hatching a conspiracy to assassinate her (The Friday Times [Lahore], February 18-24).
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistani top military brass had serious differences on several issues. One of the most serious of these concerned Pakistan’s relations with Osama bin Laden. However, the disastrous1999 Kargil conflict in Kashmir overshadowed all of these. General Butt says that Prime Minister Sharif had decided to cooperate with the United States and track down Bin Laden in 1999. According to a senior adviser to the Prime Minister, the general staff ousted Sharif to scuttle the “get-Osama” plan, among other reasons: “The evidence is that the military regime abandoned that plan.” [7] General Butt corroborates this. In his latest interview, he says that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had constituted a special task force of 90 American-trained commandos to track down Bin Laden in Afghanistan. If the Sharif government had continued on this course, this force would likely have caught Bin Laden by December 2001, but the plan was aborted by Ziauddin Butt’s successor as ISI general director, Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed.
In spite of denials by the Pakistani military, evidence is emerging that elements within the Pakistani military harbored Osama bin Laden with the knowledge of former army chief General Pervez Musharraf and possibly current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. Former Pakistani Army Chief General Ziauddin Butt (a.k.a. General Ziauddin Khawaja) revealed at a conference on Pakistani-U.S. relations in October 2011 that according to his knowledge the then former Director-General of Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan (2004 – 2008), Brigadier Ijaz Shah (Retd.), had kept Osama bin Laden in an Intelligence Bureau safe house in Abbottabad. In the same address, he revealed that the ISI had helped the CIA to track him down and kill on May 1. The revelation remained unreported for some time because some intelligence officers had asked journalists to refrain from publishing General Butt’s remarks. [1] No mention of the charges appeared until right-wing columnist Altaf Hassan Qureshi referred to them in an Urdu-language article that appeared on December 8.
In a subsequent and revealing Urdu-language interview with TV channel Dawn News, General Butt repeated the allegation on December 11, saying he fully believed that “[Brigadier] Ijaz Shah had kept this man [Bin Laden in the Abbottabad compound] with the full knowledge of General Pervez Musharraf… Ijaz Shah was an all-powerful official in the government of General Musharraf.” Asked whether General Kayani knew of this, he first said yes, but later reconsidered: “[Kayani] may have known – I do not know – he might not have known.” The general’s remarks appeared to confirm investigations by this author in May 2011 that showed that the Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was captured and killed was being used by a Pakistani intelligence agency. However, General Butt failed to explain why Bin Laden was not discovered even after Brigadier Shah and General Musharraf had left the government.
General Butt was the first head of the Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistan army and the Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1990 to 1993, and again from 1997 to 1999. Sharif promoted General Ziauddin Butt to COAS after forcibly retiring General Pervez Musharraf on October 12, 1999, but the army’s top brass revolted against the decision and arrested both Prime Minister Sharif and General Butt while installing Musharraf as the nation’s new chief executive, a post he kept as a chief U.S. ally until resigning in 2008 in the face of an impending impeachment procedure.
Brigadier Shah has been known or is alleged to have been involved in several high profile cases of terrorism. The Brigadier was heading the ISI bureau in Lahore when General Musharraf overthrew Prime Minister Sharif in October 1999. Later, General Musharraf appointed Shah as Home Secretary in Punjab. As an ISI officer he was also the handler for Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was involved in the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002. Omar Saeed Sheikh surrendered to Brigadier Shah who hid him for several weeks before turning him over to authorities. In February 2004, Musharraf appointed Shah as the new Director of the Intelligence Bureau, a post he kept until March 2008 (Daily Times [Lahore] February 26, 2004; Dawn [Karachi] March 18, 2008). The late Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto accused Brigadier Shah, among others, of hatching a conspiracy to assassinate her (The Friday Times [Lahore], February 18-24).
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistani top military brass had serious differences on several issues. One of the most serious of these concerned Pakistan’s relations with Osama bin Laden. However, the disastrous1999 Kargil conflict in Kashmir overshadowed all of these. General Butt says that Prime Minister Sharif had decided to cooperate with the United States and track down Bin Laden in 1999. According to a senior adviser to the Prime Minister, the general staff ousted Sharif to scuttle the “get-Osama” plan, among other reasons: “The evidence is that the military regime abandoned that plan.” [7] General Butt corroborates this. In his latest interview, he says that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had constituted a special task force of 90 American-trained commandos to track down Bin Laden in Afghanistan. If the Sharif government had continued on this course, this force would likely have caught Bin Laden by December 2001, but the plan was aborted by Ziauddin Butt’s successor as ISI general director, Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed.
Wednesday, December 7, 2011
Al-Shabab Changes Name to 'Somali Islamic Emirate'
Via barigaafrika.com (Dec 7, 2011) -
A major conference to discuss the future of Al-Shabab which has been ongoing in Baydhabo, Bay Regions [south western Somalia] in the last five days has now been concluded after which a statement was issued.
The conference was attended by clerics from areas under Al-Shabab control as well as senior Al-Shabab officials among them Sheikh Hasan Dahir Aweys, Shaykh Muqtar Robow and other prominent figures of the extremists group.
Towards the end of the conference, religious clerics attending the conference addressed the gathering in which they all expressed their excitement in the participation of the conference dubbed "the future of Al-Shabab".
The statement issued at the end of the conference comprised of seven major points some of which the Somali public are already quite familiar with while others are new and are to effect major changes in Al-Shabab.
[...]
The name 'Movement for the Al-Shabab Mujahidin' is to be replaced with 'Somali Islamic Emirate'. It has been said that as from the time of the release of the statement, the official name for the men used to be known as Al-Shabab will be 'Somali Islamic Emirate'.
Some of the new points in the statement include the formation of a new organization for Somali religious scholars that is to be under Al-Shabab which has been renamed as Islamic Emirate. It is believed that the whole point of this conference was to change Al-Shabab's name given that the rest of the points in the statement are issues which have already been implemented in areas under the group's control.
A major conference to discuss the future of Al-Shabab which has been ongoing in Baydhabo, Bay Regions [south western Somalia] in the last five days has now been concluded after which a statement was issued.
The conference was attended by clerics from areas under Al-Shabab control as well as senior Al-Shabab officials among them Sheikh Hasan Dahir Aweys, Shaykh Muqtar Robow and other prominent figures of the extremists group.
Towards the end of the conference, religious clerics attending the conference addressed the gathering in which they all expressed their excitement in the participation of the conference dubbed "the future of Al-Shabab".
The statement issued at the end of the conference comprised of seven major points some of which the Somali public are already quite familiar with while others are new and are to effect major changes in Al-Shabab.
[...]
The name 'Movement for the Al-Shabab Mujahidin' is to be replaced with 'Somali Islamic Emirate'. It has been said that as from the time of the release of the statement, the official name for the men used to be known as Al-Shabab will be 'Somali Islamic Emirate'.
Some of the new points in the statement include the formation of a new organization for Somali religious scholars that is to be under Al-Shabab which has been renamed as Islamic Emirate. It is believed that the whole point of this conference was to change Al-Shabab's name given that the rest of the points in the statement are issues which have already been implemented in areas under the group's control.
Monday, December 5, 2011
Pakistan: Anti-Terror Agreements With U.S. To Be Dropped
Via The Express Tribune (Pakistan) -
Pakistan has decided to scrap all existing anti-terror cooperation agreements with the United States in a development that may not only take the uneasy alliance between the two countries to the point of no return but also impede world efforts at bringing sustainable peace in Afghanistan.
The decision, which was taken after consultations at the top civil and military levels following the Nato airstrikes, is part of a review of political, diplomatic and military ties with the US, officials familiar with the development told The Express Tribune.
This, however, does not mean the government is seeking a complete breakdown in the relationship with the US. Rather, it is aiming to enter a fresh agreement that clearly states in writing Pakistan’s ‘red lines’ and firm assurance from Washington not to violate those in the future, added the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
Pakistan has decided to scrap all existing anti-terror cooperation agreements with the United States in a development that may not only take the uneasy alliance between the two countries to the point of no return but also impede world efforts at bringing sustainable peace in Afghanistan.
The decision, which was taken after consultations at the top civil and military levels following the Nato airstrikes, is part of a review of political, diplomatic and military ties with the US, officials familiar with the development told The Express Tribune.
This, however, does not mean the government is seeking a complete breakdown in the relationship with the US. Rather, it is aiming to enter a fresh agreement that clearly states in writing Pakistan’s ‘red lines’ and firm assurance from Washington not to violate those in the future, added the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
Sunday, November 27, 2011
Phone Hacking Tied to Terrorists
Via NY Times -
Four people in the Philippines hacked into the accounts of AT&T business customers in the United States and diverted money to a group that financed terrorist attacks across Asia, according to police officials in the Philippines.
A statement from the Philippines Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, a law enforcement agency, said three men and one woman had been arrested in raids across the capital, Manila, last week.
According to the agency, the men were working with a group called Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist group linked to Al Qaeda and responsible for the 2002 bombings in Bali, which killed 202 people.
The group has been held responsible for several other terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, mostly in Indonesia but including the Philippines.
If the new accusation holds up, it would point to a troubling connection between hackers and terrorist cells.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation said on Saturday that it was working with the police in the Philippines on the investigation into the telephone hacking effort, which apparently began as early as 2009.
The suspects remotely gained access to the telephone operating systems of an unspecified number of AT&T clients and used them to call telephone numbers that passed on revenues to the suspects.
--------------------------------------------
Jemaah Islamiah (JI) is a Southeast Asian militant Islamic organization dedicated to the establishment of a Daulah Islamiyah (regional Islamic caliphate) in Southeast Asia incorporating Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei. JI was added to the United Nations 1267 Committee's list of terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaeda or the Taliban on 25 October 2002 under UN Security Council Resolution 1267.
After the 2002 Bali bombings, the U.S. State Department designated Jemaah Islamiah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Four people in the Philippines hacked into the accounts of AT&T business customers in the United States and diverted money to a group that financed terrorist attacks across Asia, according to police officials in the Philippines.
A statement from the Philippines Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, a law enforcement agency, said three men and one woman had been arrested in raids across the capital, Manila, last week.
According to the agency, the men were working with a group called Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist group linked to Al Qaeda and responsible for the 2002 bombings in Bali, which killed 202 people.
The group has been held responsible for several other terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, mostly in Indonesia but including the Philippines.
If the new accusation holds up, it would point to a troubling connection between hackers and terrorist cells.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation said on Saturday that it was working with the police in the Philippines on the investigation into the telephone hacking effort, which apparently began as early as 2009.
The suspects remotely gained access to the telephone operating systems of an unspecified number of AT&T clients and used them to call telephone numbers that passed on revenues to the suspects.
--------------------------------------------
Jemaah Islamiah (JI) is a Southeast Asian militant Islamic organization dedicated to the establishment of a Daulah Islamiyah (regional Islamic caliphate) in Southeast Asia incorporating Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei. JI was added to the United Nations 1267 Committee's list of terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaeda or the Taliban on 25 October 2002 under UN Security Council Resolution 1267.
After the 2002 Bali bombings, the U.S. State Department designated Jemaah Islamiah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Thursday, November 10, 2011
The Rising Threat from Nigeria's Boko Haram Militant Group
Via STRATFOR (Security Weekly) -
The U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, issued a warning Nov. 5 indicating it had received intelligence that the Nigerian militant group Boko Haram may have been planning to bomb several targets in the Nigerian capital during the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha, also known as Eid al-Kabir, celebrated Nov. 6-8. The warning specifically mentioned the Hilton, Nicon Luxury and Sheraton hotels as potential targets.
The warning came in the wake of a string of bombings and armed attacks Nov. 4 in the cities of Maiduguri, Damaturu and Potiskum, all of which are located in Nigeria’s northeast. An attack also occurred in the north-central Nigerian city of Kaduna. The sites targeted in the wave of attacks included a military base in Maiduguri and the anti-terrorism court building in Damaturu. Militants reportedly attacked these two sites with suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The Nigerian Red Cross reported that more than 100 people were killed in the attacks, while some media reports claimed the death toll was at least 150.
According to AFP, a spokesman for Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attacks Nov. 5 and threatened more attacks targeting the Nigerian government until “security forces stop persecuting our members and vulnerable civilians.” On Nov. 7, a Boko Haram spokesman claimed that his group employed only two suicide operatives in the attacks and not 12 as reported by some media outlets.
Though Eid al-Kabir passed without attacks on Western hotels in Abuja, a deeper examination of Boko Haram is called for, with a specific focus on its rapidly evolving tactical capabilities.
Read more: The Rising Threat from Nigeria's Boko Haram Militant Group | STRATFOR
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CFR Backgrounder: Boko Haram
http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739
Boko Haram, an Islamist religious sect, has targeted Nigeria's police, rival clerics, politicians, and public institutions with increasing violence since 2009.
The U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, issued a warning Nov. 5 indicating it had received intelligence that the Nigerian militant group Boko Haram may have been planning to bomb several targets in the Nigerian capital during the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha, also known as Eid al-Kabir, celebrated Nov. 6-8. The warning specifically mentioned the Hilton, Nicon Luxury and Sheraton hotels as potential targets.
The warning came in the wake of a string of bombings and armed attacks Nov. 4 in the cities of Maiduguri, Damaturu and Potiskum, all of which are located in Nigeria’s northeast. An attack also occurred in the north-central Nigerian city of Kaduna. The sites targeted in the wave of attacks included a military base in Maiduguri and the anti-terrorism court building in Damaturu. Militants reportedly attacked these two sites with suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The Nigerian Red Cross reported that more than 100 people were killed in the attacks, while some media reports claimed the death toll was at least 150.
According to AFP, a spokesman for Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attacks Nov. 5 and threatened more attacks targeting the Nigerian government until “security forces stop persecuting our members and vulnerable civilians.” On Nov. 7, a Boko Haram spokesman claimed that his group employed only two suicide operatives in the attacks and not 12 as reported by some media outlets.
Though Eid al-Kabir passed without attacks on Western hotels in Abuja, a deeper examination of Boko Haram is called for, with a specific focus on its rapidly evolving tactical capabilities.
Read more: The Rising Threat from Nigeria's Boko Haram Militant Group | STRATFOR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CFR Backgrounder: Boko Haram
http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739
Boko Haram, an Islamist religious sect, has targeted Nigeria's police, rival clerics, politicians, and public institutions with increasing violence since 2009.
Wednesday, November 9, 2011
Your Questions: Kenya's Campaign Against Al-Shabab
Via Voice of America (VOA) News -
Kenya sent troops into Somalia last month in pursuit of al-Shabab, which it blames for a series of cross-border kidnappings. Since then, Kenya has faced the threat (and reality) of retaliation, confusion has emerged over which countries are supporting the military operation, and Eritrea has come under suspicion of arming al-Shabab. Most recently, Kenya said it is moving in on key militant areas in Somalia.
VOA's East Africa correspondent Gabe Joselow answered your questions about Kenya's pursuit of al-Shabab in a live Q&A Wednesday (Video).
Kenya sent troops into Somalia last month in pursuit of al-Shabab, which it blames for a series of cross-border kidnappings. Since then, Kenya has faced the threat (and reality) of retaliation, confusion has emerged over which countries are supporting the military operation, and Eritrea has come under suspicion of arming al-Shabab. Most recently, Kenya said it is moving in on key militant areas in Somalia.
VOA's East Africa correspondent Gabe Joselow answered your questions about Kenya's pursuit of al-Shabab in a live Q&A Wednesday (Video).
Saturday, November 5, 2011
Operation Odysseus: Leader Dies in Colombian Military Operation
Via CNN -
The leader of Colombia's main leftist rebel group -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -- died in a military operation in the country's southwest, President Juan Manuel Santos said Saturday.
"I confirm the death of Alfonso Cano. The No. 1 of FARC is dead," Santos said. "This is the most overwhelming blow given to the FARC in all of Colombia's history."
The military operation that took place Friday in the state of Cauca also killed Cano's communications chief, a female friend and members of his security team, Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon told reporters. Cano's chief of security was captured.
"The death of Alfonso Cano is the most important historical mark of our military forces and our national police in our fight against the FARC organization," Pinzon said. "He was part of the organization for over 33 years. He was their ideologue, their political figure and most importantly, he was a despised terrorist ready to act in a radical way ..."
Cano, an alias for Guillermo Leon Saenz, took over the FARC's top spot in March 2008 after an apparent heart attack killed the former leader, Manuel Marulanda.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRATFOR Dispatch: FARC Leader Killed in Colombia
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111107-dispatch-farc-leader-killed
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC or FRAC-EP) is a Marxist–Leninist revolutionary guerrilla organization based in Colombia which is involved in the ongoing Colombian armed conflict. FARC is a violent non-state actor (VNSA), described as a terrorist group by the Colombian government, the United States Department of State, the Canadian government, the Chilean government, the New Zealand Government, and the European Union.
FARC receives most of its funding—which has been estimated to average some $300 million per year—from taxation of the illegal drug trade, ransom kidnappings, bank robberies, and extortion of large landholders, multinational corporations, and agribusiness. Human Rights Watch estimates that the FARC has the majority of child combatants in Colombia, estimating that approximately one quarter of the guerrillas are under 18 years of age.
The leader of Colombia's main leftist rebel group -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -- died in a military operation in the country's southwest, President Juan Manuel Santos said Saturday.
"I confirm the death of Alfonso Cano. The No. 1 of FARC is dead," Santos said. "This is the most overwhelming blow given to the FARC in all of Colombia's history."
The military operation that took place Friday in the state of Cauca also killed Cano's communications chief, a female friend and members of his security team, Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon told reporters. Cano's chief of security was captured.
"The death of Alfonso Cano is the most important historical mark of our military forces and our national police in our fight against the FARC organization," Pinzon said. "He was part of the organization for over 33 years. He was their ideologue, their political figure and most importantly, he was a despised terrorist ready to act in a radical way ..."
Cano, an alias for Guillermo Leon Saenz, took over the FARC's top spot in March 2008 after an apparent heart attack killed the former leader, Manuel Marulanda.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRATFOR Dispatch: FARC Leader Killed in Colombia
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20111107-dispatch-farc-leader-killed
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC or FRAC-EP) is a Marxist–Leninist revolutionary guerrilla organization based in Colombia which is involved in the ongoing Colombian armed conflict. FARC is a violent non-state actor (VNSA), described as a terrorist group by the Colombian government, the United States Department of State, the Canadian government, the Chilean government, the New Zealand Government, and the European Union.
FARC receives most of its funding—which has been estimated to average some $300 million per year—from taxation of the illegal drug trade, ransom kidnappings, bank robberies, and extortion of large landholders, multinational corporations, and agribusiness. Human Rights Watch estimates that the FARC has the majority of child combatants in Colombia, estimating that approximately one quarter of the guerrillas are under 18 years of age.
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