To start, the investigators set up a dummy construction company that in reality was no more than a mail drop in Martinsburg, W.Va.
Twenty-eight days and no questions from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission later, the "company" received a license to legally buy certain quantities of Americium-241 and Cesium-137.
"It was much too easy, much too easy, to get the licenses that would have allowed individuals setting up a dummy corporation to obtain enough material to create a dirty bomb," said Sen. Norm Coleman, R-Minn., who initiated the investigation in his role as ranking member of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
Dirty bombs are composed of a conventional explosives and radioactive material but don't generate a nuclear explosion.
Documents seized from al Qaeda operative Dhiren Barot, who was sentenced to life in prison in the U.K. last November, detail plans for a dirty bomb with Americium that would "maximize terror and chaos" in a series of coordinated attacks.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission says it regrets issuing the license without first checking out the buyer, but it stressed it doesn't believe a radioactive dirty bomb is a significant threat.
"If the effects are psychological and not real, we should not hype it," Edward McGaffigan, a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission since 1996, said. "Things nuclear get hyped, things chemical apparently do not."
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Via TimesUnion.com -COLONIE -- Federal inspectors were able to slip a fake bomb through a checkpoint at Albany International Airport during a test of the facility's Transportation Security Administration screeners, according to individuals familiar with the incident.
The unannounced inspection by TSA officials took place early last week. The airport's security measures failed in five of seven tests, most of the problems occurring at the passenger checkpoint, the sources said.
In one test, TSA inspectors hid the components of a fake bomb in carry-on luggage that also contained a bottle of water. Passengers are prohibited from carrying containers holding more than three ounces of liquids, gels or aerosols through airport checkpoints.
The screeners at Albany International confiscated the water bottle but missed the bomb. In all, the inspectors slipped four banned items through the main checkpoint during the test, sources said.
...
Paul Varville, the TSA's security director at Albany International, could not be reached for comment.
Ann Davis, a TSA spokeswoman, declined to discuss the circumstances of the covert test at Albany International.
"We don't discuss the results because they tend to paint an inaccurate picture of the competency of our work force," she said. "The tests are designed to be incredibly difficult and TSA does anticipate a fair level of failure."
...
Last October, the Star-Ledger newspaper of Newark, citing unnamed federal security officials, reported screeners at Newark Liberty International Airport flunked 20 of 22 tests, including failing to detect bombs and guns in luggage at checkpoints.
The TSA responded to the report by launching an internal investigation in which federal employees were interrogated about whether they had leaked the results, the newspaper said.
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At two airports in Houston last month, TSA officials swarmed the facilities as security and "behavior detection" officers conducted random screening of approximately 5,200 employees and passengers at boarding gates, according to the TSA.
Five employees with expired airport security badges were found as were two who did not have credentials. The expired badges were confiscated and the employees in violation were escorted off airport property, according to a TSA news release.
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Let me see if I understand this correctly. The TSA "anticipates a fair level of failure" when detecting bomb parts in carry-on bags? Well thank god I take my shoes off....
On the dirty bomb stuff, I have to agree with Mr. McGaffigan. We are not talking about an atomic bomb...we are talking about a dirty bomb. Basically it is a standard bomb with some radioactive material thrown inside. The addition of radioactive material acts mostly as a psychological multiplier over the fear caused by a standard bomb.
But regardless of how Mr. McGaffigan feels about dirty bombs, if attackers did get hold of these materials and did set off even a small dirty bomb it would have its intended effect. It would scare the crap out of the general public even more than a standard bomb...the psychological multiplier works because many lack understanding of the real threat.
But let’s look at the real issue.
Is the NCR required to check buyers before issuing a license? I would assume yes. Then why didn't this happen?? Dirty bomb stuff aside, they clearly won't doing the stuff they are suppose to do.
But maybe I am just taking crazy pills.
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