Taking a page from L0pht Heavy Industries, Alexander Sotirov, Jacob Appelbaum, and a team of researchers whose identities have to remain secret for now are making the theoretical possible this Tuesday at the 25th Chaos Communication Congress in Berlin. The details of their presentation have been heavily censored leading up the event, with only a handful of security researchers, journalists, and collaborators given early access to the materials. Fortunately, I was one of them, and I wanted to take the opportunity to talk about their research, why it is important, and why the pre-conference secrecy is justified.
First things first; the reason for secrecy. Their research combined a known weakness in one area with a massive resource investment in another to show that a third party was vulnerable to a practical attack that affects the security of all Internet users. Security researchers often release code and technical documentation to demonstrate a flaw, but in this case, they went a step further and used the attack in the real world to obtain proof that it works. This process required interaction with a third party that will likely do whatever they can to save face once the details become public.
To prepare for the fallout, Alexander and Jacob have been working with a legal team to review their work and advise them on the best way to disclose the issue without finding themselves at the receiving end of a lawsuit. From my own conversations with Alexander, I don't believe they broke any laws, but in the past few years there have been multiple unjustified legal actions and threats against researchers who have tried to warn the public about serious security issues.
The last ten years have shown us that it is usually better to ask for forgiveness than permission when it comes to vulnerability disclosure. Vendors have a financial interest in protecting their reputation and this is apparent in the number of pre-disclosure threats they make; however, once the proverbial cat is out of the bag, it is cheaper to address the problem than to proceed with legal action, since that legal action will usually result in even worse publicity for the vendor. If your organization is withholding vulnerability information due to concerns over a legal reaction from the affected vendor, then you have already lost the game and are doing a disservice to every user that relies on that vendor's product or service.
Switching back to the actual presentation; there are three things that make their research impressive. First, their work involved serious collaboration between academia and independent security researchers. This type of coordination is tough to manage and nearly impossible to actually publish anything under terms everyone can agree to. Jacob's previous work on cold-boot memory attacks faced similar challenges and the end result was partial disclosure of the developed tools (the BitLocker code was never released). Second, their research required massive computational resources that had to be utilized within a specific window of time. Although computing costs have dropped significantly over the last few years, the researchers estimated that commercially available computation resources such as Amazon EC2 put the technique within the grasp of a profitable criminal organization, large botnet operator and certainly state sponsors. The attack only has to be performed once in order to reap rewards for a long time afterward (months, if not years). This one-time investment model could pay for itself many times over if it was used to provide services to criminal organizations. Finally, they actually did it. This isn't a pie-in-the-sky talk about what may happen or what someone might be able to do, this is a demonstration of what they actually did with the results to prove it.
Their live presentation will be available online via streaming video, it is scheduled for Saal 1 at 3:15pm (8:15am CST, 9:15am EST, 6:15am PST) on Tuesday, December 30th. Keep an eye on the schedule in case their timeslot is moved.
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