Today's article at The Wall Street Journal on the resurgence of al Qaeda in the Afghan east has provided a great service in shining light on al Qaeda's presence in region. This is a subject that longtime readers of The Long War Journal will easily recognize, as we've devoted a significant portion of our coverage to al Qaeda's presence and networks in the area, as well as to the impact of the US military withdrawal from combat outposts in Kunar and Nuristan provinces.
But the WSJ article also highlights, both intentionally and unintentionally, some very significant failures in the US military and intelligence communities' analysis of the nature of al Qaeda and the scope of the threat in the Afghan northeast. At the very end of the WSJ article, a senior US military official is quoted making the following claim:
"We do not have an intelligence problem. We have a capacity problem. We generally know the places they are, how they are operating," said the senior U.S. military official, speaking of al Qaeda. The problem "is our ability to get there and do something."I'm here to tell you that that viewpoint is wrong. And here's why:
Read more:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2011/04/al_qaeda_never_left_kunar_and.php
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Like LL Cool J once said, "Don't call it a comeback / I've been here for years."
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